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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: DISPUTES CLAUSES AND
THE WUNDERLICH ACT
The power of the government to contract is a recognized incident to
its right of sovereignty. However, the government as sovereign is immune
to suit upon its contracts in the absence of its consent. The federal
government 1 has generally consented to suits against it based on express
or implied contracts vesting jurisdiction over such suits in the Court
of Claims 2 and in actions not exceeding $10,000.00 concurrent jurisdiction

in the appropriate district court.3
4
is directly to the Supreme Court

Appeal from the Court of Claims

Contracts with the United States government usually contain what is
known as a standard disputes clause which provides as follows:
Disputes-Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
contract, all disputes concerning questions of fact arising under
this contract shall be decided by the contracting officer subject
to written appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the head of
the department concerned or his duly authorized representative,
whose decisions shall be final and conclusive upon the parties
thereto. In the meantime the contractor shall diligently proceed
with the work as directed.5
Under the procedure of one federal agency,6 the Atomic Energy Commission, if a dispute arising under a contract cannot be disposed of by
mutual agreement, the contracting officer makes findings of fact and renders
his decision, An appeal may then be taken within sixty days by serving
notice in writing upon the contracting officer. The complaint, if not
filed with the notice of appeal, must be served upon the hearing examiner
within twenty days after the service of the notice of appeal. Within twenty
days after service of the complaint, the contracting officer must serve an
answer. The hearing examiner sets the time and place of the hearing
and serves a thirty day notice of such upon the parties. The hearing is
conducted as a trial de novo of the issues of fact and law. After sixty
I.

91 C.J.S. United States § 82 (1955).

2.

28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958),

4.

28 U.S.C. § 1255 (1958).

which provides as follows:

The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claim against the United States founded . . . upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1958), which confers concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases
upon the United States District Courts:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with
the Court of Claims, of . . . Any . . . civil action or claim against the
the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded . . . upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
5.
6.

41 U.S.C. Appendix (Rules and Regs.) 54.13 (1958).
There are contract appeals boards functioning in the following agencies: Department of Defense; Department of the Interior; Army Corps of Engineers; Post Office
Department; Veterans Administration; Department of Agriculture; Department of
Commerce; General Services Administration; National Aeronautics and Space
Administration; and the Atomic Energy Commission.
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days the decision of the hearing examiner becomes the final action of the
Commission, unless a petition for review and supporting brief are filed
within such period with the Secretary of the Commission. The respondent
may file an opposing brief within twenty days. If the petition is denied,
the decision of the hearing examiner becomes the final action of the
Commission. If the petition is granted, the Commission proceeds to a
final decision.7
In the case of United States v. Wunderlich,8 the Supreme Court
construed a standard dispute clause included in a contract entered into by
the Bureau of Reclamation with the Martin Wunderlich Company for the
construction of the Vallecito Dam, located in the southern part of Colorado.
Mr. Justice Minton, writing the majority opinion in a six-three decision
held, that judicial review of an administrative decision on a question of
fact under the disputes clause is limited to cases in which such decision
... was founded on fraud, alleged or proved." Fraud was defined as
"... conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest." justice
Minton went on to expressly invite legislation on the subject: "If the
standard of fraud that we adhere to is too limited, that is a matter for
Congress." 9
In United States v. Moorman,'0 the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of a contract provision giving to government officers the power to determine questions of law arising under such contract. The question here
was whether or not the contractor was required under the contract to
grade a taxiway shown on the drawings, but not located within the aircraft
plant site as described in the specifications. The Supreme Court again
expressly invited leglislation: "No Congressional enactment condemns
their creation or enforcement." 1 1
Three years after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
the Wunderlich case, Congress enacted legislation for the purpose of overruling it and the Moorman case.' 2 The first part of this act deals with
the problem of the Wunderlich case, i.e., judicial review of an administrative decision as to questions of fact. The second part of the act deals
with the problem of the Moorman case, i.e., judicial review of an administrative decision as to questions of law. Commonly known as the Wunderlich Act, it provides as follows:
No provision of any contract entered into by the United
States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of
the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized
representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising
7. 10 C.F.R. § 3 (Supp. 1962).
8. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
9. Wunderlich v. United States. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
justices Douglas, Reed and
Jackson dissenting.
10. 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
11. United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
12. Volentine and Littleton v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 952 (Ct. CI. 1956); United
States v. Lennox Metal Manufacturing Co., Inc., 225 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955).

NOTES

under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to
be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases
where fraud by such official or his said representative or board is
alleged: Provided, however, unless the same is fraudulent or
capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to
imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence."
No Government contract shall contain a provision making
final on a question of law the 14decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board.
The Congressional purpose of the Wunderlich Act was to reinstate
the law to what it was presumed to have been before the Supreme Court
decisions in the Mooreman and the Wunderlich cases. Prior to these
decisions it was generally understood, that administrative decisions as to
questions of law were not final, but administrative decisions rendered
under disputes clauses as to questions of fact were final and would not
be reviewed by the courts, unless the decision was fraudulent, or arbitrary,
or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith. 15
The new law is, however, different in this fundamental respect; the courts
must now render their decisions as to the standard disputes clauses in the
light of a statute rather than in the light of the prior decisions. Before
the Wunderlich Act there was no legislative enactment dealing with
government contract disputes clauses. In fact, the authority of the
government's contracting officers and the boards of appeal is not statutory,
but is derived solely from the disputes clauses in their contracts. Therefore, they are not subject to the Administrative Procedures Act.' 6 The
boards are administrative in character of course, and their decisions are
consistently referred to as such by the courts.
The difficulty is nearly the same as before the Wunderlich decision,
namely, what sort of judicial review is a contractor with the government
entitled to under a disputes clause? How does the act affect the decisions
of the courts? Since the passage of the act, a split authority has developed
between the Court of Claims, which has allowed the contractor a de novo
review of every aspect of the case, and the circuit and district courts,
which have held as a general rule, that the contractor, in his appeal from
an adverse administrative decision, is only entitled to a review of the
17
administrative record.
The Court of Claims position is reflected by Volentine and Littleton
v. United States.'8 The contractor claimed damages resulting from the
closing of a dam on the Brazos River in Texas, thereby inundating the
13.
14.
15.

41 U.S.C. § 321 (1958).
41 U.S.C. § 322 (1958).
Government Contracts-Finality Clauses, H.R. Rep. No. 1380, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
24 (1954).

16.

17.
18.

See, 6 Code Fed. Regs. § 400.1 (f) (1956), which provides that, "The provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (Pub. Law 404, 79th Cong., 5 U.S.C., § 1001-1011)
are not applicable to proceedings before the Board (Contract Disputes Board for
the Commodity Credit Corporation) ......
See, H. L. Yoh Co., Inc. v. United States, 288 F.2d 493 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
145 F. Supp. 952 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
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lower part of the contractor's work. The contract contained a disputes
clause giving the government's contracting officer the power to decide
questions of fact subject to the right of the contractor to appeal to the
head of the department, whose decision was to be final. Having exhausted
the administrative remedies, the contractor appeal to the Court of Claims,
alleging that the departmental decision was arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent and not based on substantial evidence. Thus, the contractor brought
his case within the provision of the Wunderlich Act.
The government argued, that the derogatory language of the statute
could not be applied, unless the administrative record, upon which the
departmental decision was based, was considered without the taking of
additional information by the court. Judge Madden, in rejecting the
government's argument, wrote as follows:

There is logic in the Government's position. But we do not
adopt it. It would require two trials in many cases involving this
question. The first trial would include the presentation of the
"administrative record" and its study to determine whether, on
the basis of what was in it, the administrative decision was
tolerable ...
The second trial referred to above would be a trial on the
merits, with all relevant evidence admissible, whether it was in
the "administrative record" or not. That trial would be necessary in every case where we decided, on the first trial, that the
departmental decision was not final.")
In Carlo Bianchi and Company v. United States,20 a case supporting
the rule of the Volentine decision, the contractor was allowed to present
fifteen witnesses in the Court of Claims although only four witnesses had
testified for the contractor in the administrative proceeding. The Court
of Claims found that the contracting officer's decision was not supported
by substantial evidence. Judge Madden gave the opinion of the Court:
In our opinion in Volentine and Littleton v. United States,
• . . holding that the trial in this court should not be limited to
the record made before the contracting agency, but should be
de novo, we recocgnized that there were logical weaknesses in our
position. We concluded, however, that the intent of Congress in
enacting the Wunderlich Act was in accord with our conclusion,
and we adhere to that conclusion in this case. 21
Several other decisions of the Court of Claims have allowed either a
trial completely de novo or additional testimony upon an appeal from an
administrative decision, all holding, essentially, that the court was not
22
restricted in rendering its decision to the record before the board.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Volentine and Littleton v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 952 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
169 F. Supp. 514 (Ct. CI. 1959).
Carlo Bianchi and Company, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 514 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
Klein v. United States, 285 F.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 1961); P.L.S. Coat & Suit Corp. v.

United States, 180 F. Supp. 400 (Ct. Cl. 1906); Anderson v. United States, 174
F. Supp. 945 (Ct. CI. 1959); J. W. Bateson v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 871
(Ct. Cl. 1958); Whitlock Corp. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 602 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
Fehhaber Corp. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 817 (Ct. CI. 1957).

NOTES

Judge Laramore, who did not take part in the decision of the Carlo
Bianchi case, wrote a dissenting opinion in the Volentine case 23 in which
he stated that:
a common sense application of the Act of May 11, 1954
supra, (Wunderlich Act) considering the background of the legislation and the administrative procedures available to aggrieved
contractors, would be to apply the usual administrative review rule
and determine the question of arbitrariness, etc., and lack of substantial evidence on the record made before an appeals board,
unless the contractor alleges and proves that because of the procedures available in the Appeals Board4 as applied to 'him, he was
unable to adequately present his case.2
Judge Laramore's dissent is not unlike the position which the district
courts and the circuit courts have taken in their decisions as to the sort
of review the contractor is entitled to receive in an appeal from the
decision of a contracts appeal board. 25 The rationale of these holdings,
i.e., that the court's review is limited to the administrative record of
the appeals board, is best set out by the decisions in the cases of Mann
Chemical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States26 and United States v.. Ham27
den Co-Operative Creamery Company.
In the Mann Chemical Laboratories case, the government and the
contractor requested an order determining whether the contractor was
entitled to a trial de novo or a trial limited to a review of the administrative record. Chief Judge Sweeney, of the United States District Court of
Massachusetts, after holding that the contractor was not entitled to a
trial de novo, wrote as follows:
The relevant portion of Section 321 provides that the decision
of the agency head or his representative shall be final unless it is
"not supported by substantial evidence." First, the only logical
way to determine whether the board's decision is supported by
substantial evidence is to consider the decision in the light of the
evidence before the board. Second, the term "supported by substantial evidence" is a term of art which implies review on the
record only. .

.

. And lastly, the legislative history leaves little doubt

that Congress did not intend
to provide for a trial de novo at this
28
stage of the proceedings.
29
In United States v. Hamden Co-Operative Creamery Company,
District Judge Bartels, in holding that the contractor was not entitled to a
trial de novo, stated:
23,

Volentine and Littleton v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 952, 959 (Ct. Cl. 1956).

24.

Ibid, p. 959.

25.

United States v. Hamden Co-Operative Creamery Co., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.
New York 1960); Wells & Wells, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.
1959); United States National Bank of Portland v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 910

26.

(D.C. Ore. 1959); Mann Chemical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp.
563 (D.C. Mass. 1958).
174 F. Supp. 563 (D.C. Mass. 1958).

27.

185 F. Supp. 541

28.

Mann Chemical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 563 (D.C. Mass.

29.

1958).
185 F. Supp. 541

(E.D. New York 1960).
(E.D. New York 1960).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

Hamden having exhausted its remedies before the administrative agency, is not at this stage entitled to a new trial unless the
Board's decision is vulnerable. Otherwise the hearing before the
Board would be rendered nugatory. .

.

. No new evidence based

on affidavits, interrogatories or other documents can now be
considered by the Court, its jurisdiction being limited by the
boundaries of the statute setting forth only judicial review to
which Hamden is entitled. 30
Although the reasoning of the two cases is not the same, the conclusion reached by both courts, i.e., that the contractor is not entitled to
de novo review in an appeal from the administrative decision, is the
same. The other districts courts and the circuit courts have to date
followed this same rule and the reasoning enunciated in the above cases.8 1
The legislative history of the Wunderlich Act clearly indicates that its
purpose was to liberalize the standards for scope of review of the decisions
rendered by the government contracting agencies pursuant to a disputes
clause. 32 The number of appeals from such administrative decisions,
since the passage of the act, would indicate that this objective has been
obtained. However, the statute is not specific as to de novo review and
the legislative history is not clear on this point, (though it seems by
implication to favor the position, that the form of review be limited to
the administrative record) .3 The Wunderlich Act is specific as to the
scope of review: (1) abuse by the administrative agency of its discretion,
(2) where the administrative decision is not supported by substantial evidence and (3) when the administrative judgment is on a question of law.
In the comparable administrative law situations, it would be clear, that
de novo review would not be permitted, unless specifically provided by
statute. The "substantial evidence" rule, which is a well developed concept in administrative law, is inconsistent with the usual notion of de novo
review in which a court makes its own determination of the facts. The
legislative history has evidently not been sufficiently clear to align judicial
thinking as to the proper interpretation of the 'Wunderlich Act in this
respect.
In the case of H. L. Yoh Co., Inc. v. United States, the Court of Claims
recognized the split of authority, but did not waver from its prior decision
in Volentine and Littleton v. United States.34 In his opinion, judge
Laramore stated:
30.

United States v. Hamden Co-Operative Creamery, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 541

31.

New York 1960).
Union Painting Co., Inc. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 803 (D. Alaska 1961); M.

32.

United States, 276 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Wells & Wells, Inc. v. United States,
269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1959) ; Lowell 0. West Lumber Sales v. United States, 270 F.2d
12 (9th Cir. 1959) ; United States National Bank of Portland v. United States, 178 F.
Supp. 910 (D. Ore. 1959).
Government Contracts-Finality Clauses, H.R. Rep. No. 1380, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
24 (1954).
See, United States v. Hamden Co-Operative Creamery Co., Inc., 185 F. Supp.
541 (E.D. N.Y. 1960).
145 F. Supp. 952 (Ct. Cl. 1956).

33.
34.

(E.D.

Berger Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Penn. 1961); Hoffmann v.

NOTES

In the District Court it has been held that the review by
that court shall consist solely of a review of the administrative
record and not a trial de novo. Mann Chemical Laboratories v.
United States, D.C., 174 F. Supp. 563. However, it has been consistently held in this court that a review of an administrative
decision shall not be limited by a review of the record, as it
appeared before the agency, but that additional evidence may be
35
presented in a trial de novo.
Thus, the Court of Claims is determining whether the administrative
agencies decision was based on substantial evidence in the light of evidence that was not before the agency. The decided cases make it apparent
that some further clarification is necessary to bring about an alignment
of the courts. There are two possible sources from which clarification may
6
emanate-either a Supreme Court ruling or further legislation by Congress.3
Until resolved, the review to which a government contractor will be entitled (de novo review or review limited to the administrative record)
will depend upon the court where jurisdiction can be placed.
JAMES

35.
36.

Al.

H. L. Yoh Co., Inc. v. United States, 288 F.2d 493 (Ct. CI. 1961).
See, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 561 (1960).
See generally id. p. 578.
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